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 
Abstract—Today, cryptographic security depends primarily on 
having strong keys and keeping them secret. The keys should be 
produced by a reliable and robust to external manipulations 
generators of random numbers. To hamper different attacks, the 
generators should be implemented in the same chip as a 
cryptographic system using random numbers. It forces a designer 
to create a random number generator purely digitally. 
Unfortunately, the obtained sequences are biased and do not pass 
many statistical tests. Therefore an output of the random number 
generator has to be subjected to a transformation called post-
processing. In this paper the hash function SHA-256 as post-
processing of bits produced by a combined random bit generator 
using jitter observed in ring oscillators (ROs) is proposed. All 
components – the random number generator and the SHA-256, 
are implemented in a single Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA). We expect that the proposed solution, implemented in 
the same FPGA together with a cryptographic system, is more 
attack-resistant owing to many sources of randomness with 
significantly different nominal frequencies. 
 
Keywords—random numbers, cryptography, ring oscillators, 
hash functions, field-programmable gate arrays 
I. INTRODUCTION 
S it was noted in [1] “True randomness can’t be left to 
chance”. This sentence reflects the importance of 
randomness for cryptography. Currently, there exist several 
technically useful sources of randomness. They are: noise 
generated by a physical system [1]-[5], metastable states [7]-
[11], the chaos phenomenon [12]-[20] or jitter produced by 
ring oscillators [21]-[30]. Mixed solutions that combine 
various properties of these basic techniques also exist. Such 
sources are known as random bit generators (RBGs). They 
produce bits with bit rate of the order of several Mbit/s and 
they are not resistant to external attacks. Due to this issue, 
a good solution of a RBG needs to have an additional circuit or 
devices, dedicated to detect and disable a potential attack or 
simply shut off a random source after detecting an attack. The 
second  main  problem is  the lack of possibility to integrate an 
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analog random number generator in one microchip in order to 
be used in encryption/decryption process in dedicated 
solutions. Most of cryptographic systems are digital 
constructions. Therefore, it is expected that random number 
generators should be purely digital constructions, simply 
integrated in one chip. Nowadays there is a trend to find in 
digital circuits some behaviors or methods that will give 
possibility to produce random bit sequences “on demand”, 
with high bit rate, without any possibility to having access to 
elements of these sequences. It is proposed to use generators 
with jitter, constructed by using reprogrammable digital 
circuits or constructions based on meta-stability [31], [32]. 
Because the latter phenomenon, although interesting, is rather 
impractical for producing random bits in contemporary FPGAs 
[33], the most significant are concepts using ring oscillators or 
Galois Ring Oscillators (GARO). In both approaches jitter is 
used for signal generation [27], [31]. Random bit sequence is 
obtained by sampling signal generated by RO or GARO with 
rectangular wave with lower frequency. To obtain unbiased 
sequence that pass all known statistical tests for random 
sequences, e.g. NIST 800-22 test suite, Diehard, TestU01 or 
UC1, we need to combine bit streams produced by many RO-
based random bit generators [34]-[39]. The ring oscillators 
must also have significantly different nominal frequencies to 
prevent the injection attack [40]. It forces to use delay lines 
built into FPGAs instead of inverters or latches [39].  
To decrease the number of RO-based random bit generators 
necessary to pass all statistical tests, it is proposed in this paper 
to use SHA-256 hash function as post-processing. Both 
elements – RBG and SHA-256, were implemented in the same 
Virtex 5 FPGA (XL5VLX50T). Through experiments it has 
been shown that the minimal number of ROs that should be 
used for building a random bit generator with SHA-256 as 
post-processing is equal to eight. 
The paper is organized as follows. The idea of producing 
random bits with a combined RBG with SHA-256 as post-
processing is presented in Section II. The quality of sequences 
produced with the proposed generator is discussed in Section 
III. The last Section are conclusions.  
II. POST-PROCESSING WITH SHA-256 HASH FUNCTION 
A. A Combined RO-Based Random Bit Generator 
The simplest RBG that can be completely integrated with 
any digital system in the same FPGA uses a ring oscillator 
which output signal is sampled with a D flip-flop. Such kind of 
RBG is shown in Figure 1.  
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Generator uses jitter and frequency drift found in CMOS ring 
oscillator for random bit generation. A D-type flip-flop is 
triggered by a quartz oscillator signal which establishes the bit 
rate. Frequency fH is greater than quartz oscillator frequency fL. 
The fH of a single ring oscillator is equal to 
1 1
2
H
k k
f
d
  ,           (1) 
where dk is a delay of the k-th component of RO. The 
expression is true if all components are ideal and delays related 
with interconnections are ignored. In a real circuit delays 
caused by inner connections cannot be ignored [36]. Moreover, 
propagation delays in all circuit paths and gates vary in time, 
because of shot noise, thermal noise and supply voltage 
instability [28], [41]. Taking into account these factors the 
more realistic formula for fH is the following [28], [39]: 
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where 
a k k k
k
J dt dv dr            (3) 
is an accumulated jitter during previous half period of signal 
with frequency of fH and k delay elements. Parameter dik is the 
delay of the k-th interconnections in ring oscillator, Δdtk is the 
variation of the delay in the k-th component and 
interconnection caused by variation of temperature, Δdvk 
represents the variation of the delay in the k-th component and 
interconnection caused by supply voltage instability and Δdrk 
define others random delays in the k-th element and path in the 
ring oscillator, e.g., transition spacing or crosstalk’s. The 
accumulated jitter can be divided into deterministic component 
and nondeterministic one [28], [39]: 
a an adJ J J    ,           (4) 
where 
an nk nk nk
k
J t dv dr           (5) 
denotes an accumulated nondeterministic jitter and 
ad dk dk dk
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represents an accumulated deterministic jitter with proportion 
factor of p. 
Realization of the delay element τ can be done with even 
number of inverters, a latches chain or a delay line that is built-
in many FPGAs. The greater delay τ, the lower frequency fH is 
obtained. Due to insufficient nondeterministic factor in a single 
RO, it is necessary to combine XOR many independent 
sources of randomness [31], [34], [37]. The combined RBG 
(CRBG) is shown in Figure 2.  
(6)  
Fig. 1.  Uniformly sampled ring oscillator (RO) as a RBG 
When all rings are built in the same way, they have similar 
frequencies and the RO-based RBG is sensitive to injection 
attack [40]. To ensure the robustness to this attack, we have to 
construct ROs with significantly different nominal frequencies. 
We can choose an even number of inverters, a chain of laches 
or delay lines available in FPGAs. The comparison of nominal 
frequencies of ROs using different types of delays is available 
in [39]. In this article, the chain of latches was used as τ. In the 
first RO – one latch, in the second RO – two latches, and in the 
Nth - N latches.  
B. SHA-256 
The output bits from the combined RBG may still be biased 
and correlated for small N [34], [37]. To overcome this 
problem we can use a post-processing [44]. The scheme of 
CRBG with SHA-256 as post-processing is shown in Figure 3.  
Random bits from the combined RBG are collected in 
blocks of 8 bits. Afterwards, each byte is stored in FIFO buffer 
which is 64 byte width. This is made to prepare 512 random 
bits that are processed by SHA-256. Hash functions are used in 
cryptography mainly to check integrity and in digital signature 
schemes. The definition of hash function says that “A hash 
function is a computationally efficient function mapping 
binary strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of some 
fixed length, called hash-values” [45]. Input can consist of 
such data like text file, binary file, message, data block etc. In 
general, the length of input is not limited. A general schema 
that illustrates how does a hash function works is shown in 
Figure 4. 
A family of hash functions SHA-2 includes SHA-256, SHA-
384 and SHA-512. In this paper it was used the SHA-256. The 
algorithm comes from paper [46]. In its first step, input is 
processing by adding bit 1, next to the last significant bit and 
any number of bits 0 that L ⊕ 512 = 488, where L is length of 
the message. A family of hash functions SHA-2 includes SHA-
256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. In this paper it was used the 
SHA-256. The algorithm comes from paper [46]. In its first 
step, input is processing by adding bit 1, next to the last 
significant bit and any number of bits 0 that L ⊕ 512 = 488, 
where L is length of the message. After that L is added as 64-
bits big-edian representation. Next step is that 512 blocks split 
into smaller 32-bits blocks M (ij) where j = 0, 1, 63, and 
i = 0, 1, N, where N is a number of divided massage block. 
After splitting, the SHA-256 algorithm prepares initial values 
for H (0) – sequences of 32 bits which 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Combined RBG block diagram. 
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Fig. 3.  A combined random bit generator with SHA-256 as post-processing 
 
 
Fig. 4.  A concept of a hash function. 
 
were obtained as fractional parts of the square roots of the first 
eight primes. H (0) values are the following: 
H (0)1 = 6a09e667,  
H (0)2 = bb67ae85, 
H (0)3 = 3c6ef372, 
H (0)4 = a54ff53a,                (1) 
H (0)5 = 510e527f,  
H (0)6 = 9b05688c,  
H (0)7 = 1f83d9ab,  
H (0)8 = 5be0cd19. 
After preparation initial register values, the algorithm updates 
registers: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h. This update is calculated in 
64 steps from j = 0 to j = 63 and it goes as following: 
T1 ← h + ∑1 (e) + Ch (e, f, g) + Kj + Wj 
T2 ← ∑0 (a) + Maj (a, b, c) 
h ← g 
g ← f 
f   ← e 
e ← d + T1                     (2)   
d ← c 
c ← b 
b ← a 
a ← T1 + T2 
where: 
Ch(x, y, z) = (x ^ y) ⊕ (¬x ^ z) 
Maj(x, y, z) = (x ^ y) ⊕ (x ^ z) ⊕ (y ^ z) 
∑0(x) = S2(x) ⊕ S13(x) ⊕ S22(x) 
∑1(x) = S6(x) ⊕ S11(x) ⊕ S25(x)           (3) 
σ0(x) = S7(x) ⊕ S18(x) ⊕ R3(x) 
σ1(x) = S17(x) ⊕ S19(x) ⊕ R10(x) 
Sn – right n-bit shift 
Rn – right n-bit rotation.  
Wj – message blocks are determined as follows: 
1. for first 16 blocks: Wj = Mj(i) 
2. for rest of blocks: Wj = σ1(Wj-2)+Wj-7 +σ0(Wj-15)+Wj-16 
Kj - 32-bit words determined as fractional parts of the cube 
roots of the first sixty four primes. 
 
⊕ bitwise XOR 
^ bitwise AND 
¬ bitwise complement 
+ mod 232 addition 
Sn right shift by n bits 
Rn right rotation by n bits 
 
The next step is a calculation of intermediate hash value H (i): 
H(i)1 ← a + H1(i-1) 
H(i)2 ← a + H2(i-1) 
·                     (4) 
· 
· 
H(i)8 ← a + H8(i-1) 
 
As an output, we obtain hash value H(N) of message M 
generated as:  
H(N) = {H(N)1, H(N)2, H(N)3, H(N)4, H(N)5, H(N)6, H(N)7, H(N)8}.  
Hash function returns eight 32-bit words. The bits are sent 
via buffer and USB interface to a personal computer (PC). In 
PC the quality of generated sequence is assessed using 
statistical tests and the restarts mechanism [37], [38]. In all 
experiments the sampling frequency fL is equal to 100 MHz. 
III. THE STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF BIT SEQUENCES 
PRODUCED BY A CRBG USING ROS AND THE SHA-256  
To assess the minimal number of source generators of 
CRBG with SHA-256 as post-processing “A statistical Test 
Suite for Random and Pseudo-Random Number Generators for 
Cryptographic Applications”, document 800-22 prepared by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
was used [47]. These tests are often referred to as the NIST 
800-22 statistical test suite or, simply, the NIST 800-22 tests. 
During testing, we applied two approaches proposed by NIST: 
(1) we examined the proportion R  of sequences that passed 
a statistical test, and (2) we examined the distribution of 
S. ŁOZA, Ł. MATUSZEWSKI, M. JESSA 
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P  values computed by the software; that is, we examined the 
value of 
TP  [47].  
In the first step only one RO was connected to SHA-256 
block. The sequence of 1 Gbit length was collected and 
examined with the NIST 800-22 test suite. The results of 
experiment were unsatisfactory because most of the tests were 
failed (Table I).  
TABLE I 
THE RESULTS OF THE NIST 800-22 TESTS FOR THE CRBG WITHOUT SHA-256 
AND WITH SHA-256 
Type of test 
CRBG-1 CRBG-1 + SHA-256 
Rβ PT Rβ PT 
Frequency 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.980 
Block Frequency 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.491 
Cumulative Sums* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.976 
Runs 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.982 
Longest Run of Ones 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.977 
Rank 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Spectral DFT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Non-overlapping 
Temp.* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.954 
Overlapping 
Templates 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.757 
Universal 0.000 0.000 0.311 0.986 
Approximate Entropy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 
Random Excursions* 1.000 --- 0.242 0.564 
Random Exc. Var.** 1.000 --- 0.097 0.565 
Serial* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Linear Complexity 0.236 0.995 0.651 0.994 
 
TABLE II 
FREQUENCIES OF ROS IN THE COMBINED RBG 
RO number Frequency [MHz] 
1. 702 
2. 555 
3. 312 
4. 220 
5. 202 
6. 164 
7. 145 
8. 111 
 
TABLE III 
THE RESULTS OF THE NIST 800-22 TESTS FOR THE CRBG WITHOUT SHA-256 
AND WITH SHA-256 
Type of test 
CRBG-8 CRBG-8 + SHA-256 
Rβ PT Rβ PT 
Frequency 0.792 0.993 0.989 0.848027 
Block Frequency 0.000 0.949 0.991 0.630872 
Cumulative Sums* 0.994 0.058 0.988 0.653773 
Runs 0.000 0.803 0.991 0.680755 
Longest Run of Ones 0.000 0.906 0.992 0.908760 
Rank 0.781 0.989 0.995 0.699313 
Spectral DFT 0.000 0.885 0.988 0.216713 
Non-overlapping 
Temp.* 
0.000 0.584 0.982 0.021554 
Overlapping Templates 0.000 0.299 0.986 0.530120 
Universal 0.000 0.937 0.987 0.649612 
Approximate Entropy 0.000 0.000 0.988 0.446556 
Random Excursions* 0.595 0.976 0.986 0.199785 
Random Exc. Var.** 0.863 0.984 0.984 0.238697 
Serial* 0.000 0.000 0.989 0.308561 
Linear Complexity 0.147 0.989 0.922 0.431754 
TABLE IV 
THE RESULTS OF THE RESTARTS FOR THE CRBG WITHOUT SHA-256 AND 
WITH SHA-256 
 CRBG-8 CRBG-8 + SHA-256 
mmin 36 1 
TABLE V 
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Number of Slice Registers 2540 
Number of Slice LUTs 2467 
Number of LUT Flip Flops pairs 2824 
Max Clock Frequency 263 MHz 
 
The experiment was repeated for CRBGs that uses two, three, 
etc. source bit streams, till the all tests from NIST 800-22 were 
passed. Each source bit stream was produced by a single RO-
based RBG. The source generators differed only the delay τ in 
the ROs. During analysis, the final report file from NIST 800-
22 package were used. The tests passed a combined RBG 
using eight or more RO-based source generators. The 
frequencies of eight ROs are shown in Table II. 
 During testing the standard set of parameters proposed by 
NIST in v. 2.1.1 was assumed. The significance level was 
β = 0.01. The minimum passing value for the standard set of 
parameters was approximately 0.9805. The minimum TP  
value was 0.0001. An asterisk * denotes that this test consists 
of several subtests and that the worst result is shown. For tests 
marked with **, the minimum passing value for the standard 
set of parameters was approximately 0.9777. The results of the 
NIST statistical tests are shown in Table III.  
In the next step of the experiment it was performed a test 
based on restarts mechanism [37], [38]. This test is based on 
multiple restarts of the combined generator with the same 
initial conditions. It helps to assess the amount of randomness 
and pseudo-randomness in generated sequences. If during 
producing bits the amount of deterministic factor is prevalent, 
the sequences will be almost the same or exactly the same. 
When the non-deterministic phenomena prevails, the generated 
sequences will vary. 
 During the restarts N = 2084 sequences were generated and 
M = 19968 bits were send to PC for each restart. Next, 
M=19968 chi-square tests were performed. If a single bit in the 
sequences was produced in a non-deterministic process then 
chi-square test is passed. A computer program searches the 
results of 19968 chi-square tests for the greatest m for which the 
sequences failed the chi-square test for three successive indices, 
i.e., m, m-1 and m-2, where m=1,2,…,M. For j m  and a given 
significance level of the test, there is no reason to reject the 
hypothesis that zeros and ones occur with the same probability 
in 19968 bit sequences. The smallest j is equal to 1m  and 
denoted by mmin [37]-[39]. The results of the restarts are shown 
in Table IV.  
The described generator was implemented in Virtex-5 
(XL5VLX50T). Used resources are specified in Table IV. 
Those resources are about 9% of all resources available in 
Virtex-5 (XL5VLX50T) FPGA. The remaining 91% can be 
used for monitoring on-line the quality of random bits to detect 
any disturbances caused, e.g., by an attack and for 
implementing a cryptosystem that exploits random bits. The 
strings of bits can be produced on demand or in random 
instances, hampering cryptographic attacks. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
It is known from the literature that combining XOR bits 
produced at the same time by many independent random 
number generators is an efficient method for producing 
random sequences that pass every statistical test. This method 
requires relatively large resources, and excellent statistical 
properties can be observed for both deterministic and 
nondeterministic systems. The proposed true random number 
generator is able to provide random bits with average bit rate 
of 36 Mbit/s. The minimal number of RO that should be used 
when building the combined RBG with SHA-256 as post-
processing is eight. For smaller number of RO-based source 
generators the combined RBG does not pass all NIST 800-22 
tests. The use of SHA-256 function as post-processing 
enhances significantly the statistical properties of the output 
sequences and reduces the mmin value, but it works up to a 
certain level. When a generator produces sequences with very 
poor statistical properties, post-processing with SHA-256 does 
not improve sufficiently the statistical properties. The expected 
robustness to the injection attack results from significantly 
different frequencies of eight RO-based source generators. The 
use of ROs with significantly different frequencies hampers 
also mutual synchronization between ROs implemented in the 
same FPGA, preventing the quality degradation of RO-based 
combined RBGs implemented in various FPGAs.  
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